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ABSTRACT
Liu, Yuhang MS, Purdue University, December 2016. Measuring the Effect of Cold
Storage, Captive Supply, and Concentration on the Marketing Margin in the U.S.
Pork Industry. Major Professor: Kenneth A. Foster.
This study investigates the implication of key decision variables at the control of
processing firms in a concentrated industry. Succinctly, the decisions examined affect
the firm’s ability to buffer short run supply and demand fluctuations through storage
and access to an alternative source of specialized inputs essential to production. What
makes them different in the context of this research is a focus on high-throughput
processing plants where capacity utilization can result in cost efficiencies and a high
degree of market concentration where adjustments in quantity demanded of the spe-
cialized input can affect its price and where adjustments in the quantity supplied of
output can also affect that price. These two effects cost reduction and market power
have opposite effects of the prices of interest and the goal of this research is to esti-
mate which dominates in explaining the marketing margins within the supply chain.
This research also looks at the direct impact of concentration among the processing
sector. The U.S. pork sector provides an excellent case study for empirical analysis.
The consolidation and industrialization in meat processing and the food retail
industry in the past thirty years has added a new dimension to the U.S. food and
agricultural markets. The increasing market concentration has not only piqued the
interest of economists by but also public concerns about the competitive nature of
markets along the entire supply chain from live animals to food products. As the
size of meat packers is getting bigger, their key strategic variables may have more
impact on the marketing margin than ever before. The results show that during a
period of rapid consolidation, cold storage may have enabled firms to exploit market
vii
power. However, during a period with less consolidation (since 2000), the effect of cold
storage appears to be less significant and its dominant role shifted toward enhancing
cost efficiency. Analyzing data from 2007 to 2014, the dominant role of captive supply
appears to be in generating cost efficiencies by allowing better coordination between
dynamic short run supply and demand and optimal capacity utilization. In summary,
the results of this study indicate that with relatively stable market concentration, cold
storage and captive supply have the potential to generate important cost efficiencies
that are at least partially passed on to retailers, farmers, and further processors in
excess of any adverse effects the use of these decision variables might create but in
less stable circumstances the anti-competitive effects dominate the efficiency gains
passed through the market.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The industrialization and consolidation in the U.S food sector has changed the
business of food production, processing, distribution, and retailing in just a few
decades. With the emergence of mega-scale food processing companies and big box
retailers, farmers, consumers, policy makers, and the media are worried about the
potential for market power to erode the welfare of farmers and food consumers. Com-
panies with large shares of the market have greater ability to create non-competitive
price outcomes that benefit their profitability but may reduce the prices farmers re-
ceive and increase the price that consumers pay. This issue has not only piqued
the public interest but also that of agricultural economists who study these markets.
One important role of agricultural economics is to study such problems by developing
behavioral hypotheses and testing them with observable data. The nature of such
applied work also lends itself to providing suggestions to policy makers and promoting
public understanding of economic issues. This thesis attempts to accomplish all of
these roles by examining the behavior of firms from a profit maximization paradigm,
testing possible outcomes with data, and providing some insight for policy makers
and other interested parties.
The U.S meat processing industry is a typical case to study the market concentra-
tion issue. The meat packing sector has long received plenty of blame accusing them
of using market power to decrease the prices they pay to farmers for live animals.
In 1919 the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had reported the anti-competitive
practices by the largest five firms in the meat packing industry that urge the Congress
to pass the Packers and Stockyards Act in order to protect farmers, ranchers and con-
2sumers. According to GIPSA, the four firm concentration ratio for pork packers has
increased from 32.2% in 1985 to 65.5% at the end of 2014. Likewise, the four firm
concentration ratio of the retail grocery stores has increased from 16.8% at 1993 to
36.4% leading to renewed concerns about the competitive nature of markets along
the entire supply chain from live animals to food products.
This thesis not only focuses on market concentration but also the implication of
two key strategic variables, cold storage stock and captive supply. Market concen-
tration by itself is often associated with possible higher pricing power (Acharya &
Caudill, 2011). This thesis takes that traditional view a step further by examining a
couple of mechanisms (hereafter referred to as strategic variables) by which firms with
large market share may control their output to manipulate prices while continuing to
enjoy the benefits of economies of scale. It is important to note that only firms with
substantial market share could do this unilaterally. It is possible that firms might
collude to collectively withhold product or purchases from the market to manipulate
price. This thesis does not explore such behavior other than to examine data at
the aggregate level where firms following the same market signals may make similar
production decisions resulting in a situation that could look collusive. There is no
evidence that we are aware of which suggests active collusion by U.S. meat packers.
The two strategic variables examined in this thesis are ones that have grown in im-
portance in recent decades. They are cold storage and captive supplies. Cold storage
is a commodity storage aimed to preserve the physical natural of perishable goods.
(Williams & Wright, 1998) Captive supply is defined as livestock that is owned or
sold by a packer more than 14 days prior to slaughter (GIPSA, 2002)
Marketing margin is the difference between price at any two market level. It is
calculated as equation(1.1)
Mij = Pj − Pi (1.1)
Mij is the marketing margin between market i and j, Pi and Pj is the price at i and
j. Marketing margin is a measure of the efficiency of marketing system. The margin
represents the cost to produce output from one stage to the next and the return to
3those who doing the work. By using marketing margin as the dependent variable, it
can cover the effect from most important factors in the market. The effect of market
concentration and strategic variables on marketing margin is tested at three different
levels: Farm-Retail, Wholesale-Retail and Farm-Wholesale. All extended models are
based on the relative price spread model from Wohlgenant and Mullen. (Wohlgenant
& Mullen, 1987) There are three extended models. Only one strategic variable is
tested at one time. The packer and retailer concentration ratio are put in one model
to examine how concentration affects the marketing margin at different points along
the supply chain.
Earlier it was suggested that the strategic variables of interest have evolved in
recent years as the industry faced greater consolidation, gained economies of scale, and
captured technological gains. Thus, there are potentially competing roles that these
variable may play in the meat packing sector. The first is that of a facilitator of market
power by allowing the firms to adjust output in real time to avoid high live animal
prices and/or low wholesale or retail prices thus inflating the marketing margins.The
second is as a facilitator of logistical efficiency to allow the packing plant to operate
at optimal capacity utilization regardless of the market supply of live animals or
the demand for wholesale and retail meat products. The third role would depends
on how strategic variable affect the marketing margin. One is the implication of
strategic variable helps packers to apply pricing power that may increase the margin.
The other one is the role of strategic variable is more like logistic tool that allow
packers to reduce unit processing cost and pass the cost saving to farmers, retailers,
and consumers. The research results indicate that within a relative stable market,
the efficiency role of cold storage and captive supply dominate the anti-competitive
role and generally lead to welfare gains for farmers and consumers. The consolidation
and industrialization are not only increasing the size and scale of packing firms but
also increasing the production efficiency and lowering overall cost of production to
the benefit of all participants along the supply chain.
4The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter Two is an academic
paper that introduces the background information about the research problem; con-
tains a review of quantitative studies and previous research related to marketing
margins and the meat sector; presents the most important econometric results; and
summarizes the research findings. Chapter Three is a non-academic paper written
for general public and policy makers who are concerned about the performance and
efficiency of the meat industry. The appendices that follows are organized into three
parts. Appendix A presents a set of potentially interesting extensions of the econo-
metric model that were not included in the academic paper for technical reasons
explained therein. For readers who are interested in these models or in building upon
the research in this thesis, the detail test results can be found in the appendices.
Appendix B contains graphs of the elasticities of marketing margins with respect to
the strategic variables and market concentration ratio plotted over time. The pur-
pose of presenting these graphs is to give readers a better view how these elasticities
changed during the observed period. The last part of this thesis is the reference list
that includes all cited literature for the entire thesis.
5CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH APPROACH AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1 Introduction
Agricultural markets are often used as examples of a close approximation to per-
fectly competitive markets. The wave of industrialization and consolidation in meat
processing and the food retail industry in the past thirty years has added a new di-
mension to the U.S. food and agricultural markets. According to GIPSA, the four
firm concentration ratio for pork packers has increased from 32.2% in 1985 to 65.5%
at the end of 2014. Likewise, the four firm concentration ratio of the retail grocery
stores has increased from 16.8% at 1993 to 36.4% leading to renewed concerns about
the competitive nature of markets along the entire supply chain from live animals to
food products. Agricultural economists have expended tremendous efforts trying to
quantify the implications of concentration on markets and prices. Landes and Posner
developed an approach to analysis market power by using Lerner index. (Landes &
Posner, 1981)
Consumer demand has also shifted to more value-added products that potentially
increase the farm-retail marketing margin due to the added processing and market-
ing costs involved in providing convenience and food safety for example. When the
market is examined in two stages, farm to wholesale and wholesale to retail, the two
marketing margins may follow different patterns. For the pork industry, for exam-
ple, the Wholesale-Retail margin has increased by 72% and Farm-Retail margin has
increased by 51% from 1985 to 2014 while the Farm-Wholesale margin decreased 4%
during the same time period.
One indicator of market performance is to examine prices at different points along
the marketing channel. The effects of concentration, competition, and firm strategies
6Figure 2.1. The Four Firm Concentration Ratio of Retail Industry
and Packing industry
are reflected in the information carried in prices at different levels of the market-
ing channel as a farm commodity is transformed to wholesale and eventually retail
product. The marketing margin for a farm product is defined as the difference in
price between two points along the marketing channel. Gardner (Gardner, 1975)
proposed three forces (shifts in retail demand, shifts in farm commodity supply, and
shifts in marketing input supply) that impact the marketing margin in a perfectly
competitive market and Holloway (Holloway, 1991) extended Gardner’s model to im-
perfectly competitive markets. Wohlgenant and Mullen (Wohlgenant & Mullen, 1987)
proposed three empirical specifications based on the demand function for the farm
product in their paper and provided an empirical example by estimating the models
for the U.S. beef sector. These empirical specifications have been widely accepted to
explain marketing margins in a perfectly competitive market. (Kesavan, 1992) (Lusk,
2001)
7The traditional view of perfect competition belies the concentration that has oc-
curred beyond the farm gate and more frequently researchers are examining the po-
tential of market power from the food processing and retailing sectors. Often these
concerns have focused on animal and meat industry where concentration at the pro-
cessing sector has been more significant and comparisons between prices at different
points in the marketing channel are easier to make because the raw commodity is
straightforwardly transformed through a disassembly process into a relatively ho-
mogenous consumer good without tremendous mixing with other ingredients. Previ-
ous studies have focused on oligopoly power while Sexton expressed concern about
both oligopsony and oligopoly power in the food sector due to the increasing concen-
Figure 2.2. U.S Pork Farm-Retail, Farm-Wholesale, Wholesale-Retail
Margin, Jan 1985-Dec 2014
8tration in the major agricultural sectors (Sexton, 2000). He believed that there is a
positive (negative) correlation between concentration and selling (purchasing) price in
highly concentrated industries. Acharya (Acharya & Caudill, 2011) tested the farm-
retail price transmission and concluded that the majority of market power is driven by
concentration. When market power becomes more important, it affects the price. As
the effect may vary between different levels along the supply chain, marketing mar-
gins are expected to be affected in a predictable manner. However, other previous
studies have not consistently found statistical support for oligopsony and oligopoly
power using a variety of methodological approaches. Appelbaum provided an em-
pirical framework to test individual firm or industrys oligopoly power(Appelbaum,
1982). Azzam and Pagoulatos (Azzam & Pagoulatos, 1990) extended the conjectural
approach in industrial organization to test both oligopoly and oligoposny behavior
in the U.S meat industry. They found meat packing industry can exercise market
power at both input(farm) and output(retail) market. Muth and Wohlgenant (Muth
& Wohlgenant, 1999) built a model to measure the degree of oligopsony power in the
beef packing industry and they found no evidence of oligopsony power in 1967-1993.
As the concentration of the retail grocery industry increased from the mid-1990s, re-
searchers became interested in the oligopsony power of retailers. Chung and Tostao
(Chung & Tostao, 2012) separated the retailers’ market power from the packers’
in their study. Their result suggested that packers may exercise oligopsony market
power at the farm-wholesale level while retailers’ market power may have dominated
the wholesale-retail market in the beef packing industry in 1970-1999. They did not
conclude any correlation between marketing margin and market power.
With the rapid consolidation in agricultural markets, large companies typically
control the majority of market share. A key aspect of Cournot competition is that
firms simultaneously make their output decisions under the belief that these decisions
do not affect the optimal decisions of their competitors. In this paper, the market is
examined at two levels, farm to wholesale and wholesale to retail. Data from 2000
to 2014 were used to examine the effect of strategic variables and output decisions at
9two levels. The paper also explores the potential for both oligopoly and oligopsony




The U.S meat processing industry is considered concentrated because it has a
relatively high four firm concentration ratio. According to GIPSA, the four largest
meat packers controlled about 68% of the market share in 2012. Meat packing plants
process a single species of live animal to produce a species-specific boxed meat which
is relatively homogeneous and has a large number of substitutes for consumers to
choose between at the retail level. When a product is homogeneous in a concentrated
industry, the optimal output strategy for an individual firm is Cournot behavior
(Sexton, 2000). In such a concentrated industry, with more than one firm and a
homogeneous product, each firm’s output decision may affect the price received by
all firms.
A linear approximation of the retailers inverse demand for wholesale is
Rw = F (Qt, V ) = α− β ∗Qt + µ ∗ V (2.1)
Where Qt is the total production from all meat packers, Rw is the wholesale market
price, and V indicates other factors that may affect the wholesale price such as strate-
gic variables at the control of the oligopolist/oligosonist and market power. The total
industry production, Qt, is the sum of output by all firms such that




The revenue for firm i is
Yi = Qi ∗Rw (2.3)
It can be rewritten as
Yi = Qi ∗ (α− β ∗ (Qi +
∑
Qj) + µ ∗ V ) (2.4)
Qj is the total production from all meat packers except firm i. The total revenue
of firm i is not only dependent on its own output decision, but also all other firms’
production. For simplicity, assume that all packers face the same supply of live
animals and have the same mechanisms, if any, by which to discriminate the prices
they pay for their specialized input (live animals). Thus, all packers are anticipated
to pay the same price for the specialized input. If there is oligopsony power in the
farm-to-wholesale market, firms may be able to negotiate a lower price to decrease
their production cost while their revenue still depends on their own output decision
and that of their competitors.
2.2.2 Lerner Index
The Lerner index has a long history of use in measuring a firms market power
in terms of its ability to markup price above marginal cost. Arithmetically, the
Lerner Index (L) is L = P−MC
P
where P is price and MC is the firms marginal cost.
In the meat industry, the marginal cost of the meat packer is dominated by the
cost of live animals and for further packer it is the wholesale carcass. Adjusting
for retail or wholesale equivalence, the Lerner index for the meat packer can be





, where Pr is the retail price for pork, Pf is the
live animal price at farm, MM is the marketing margin of pork. When the Lerner
index is used as an index of market power for the industry, it can be expressed as
L = HHI
d
, where HHI is the Herfindahl index and d is the elasticity of demand. If
the market is perfectly competitive with many firms, P = MC and Lerner index is




. Oligopoly is a
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more complicated structure where the market is dominated by a few large firms. If
one packer offers a higher price for live animals, all farmers would like to sell their
animals to this company. Then other companies will try to match the higher price
to fulfill their production needs. The market price will reach equilibrium that there
is no difference (net of transactions costs) for farmers to sell their animals to one or
another packer in a given market area. It is the same story when packers sell wholesale
products to retailers. Retailers will not pay a higher/lower price unless there is quality
difference in product or some other value proposition. Suppose all firms set their
output quantities simultaneously, and market price is determined by total industry
output. With capacity constraints and a dynamic market environment, Cournot
competition is the best response of each firm to maximize its profit. When each firm
has unlimited production capacity, and sets price simultaneously, market price will
be the same as that under perfect competition (Bertrand equilibrium) and equal to
the marginal cost. Each firm’s profit is zero and the industry average Lerner index
is zero. Whether the industry is under Cournot competition or Bertrand equilibrium
or somewhere between these two equilibriums, depends on the firms’ decisions on
quantity or price. The Lerner index can be rewritten as follows:







MM = λ ∗ HHI
d
∗ P (2.7)
Where λ is a function of aggregate strategic behaviors across the industry. λ(·)is
the i possible strategies that a firm might strategically use in an oligopoly market to
maximize its profit. When all firms only strategy is to set their output quantity at
the Cournot equilibrium level to maximize their profit, λ equals 1 and L = λ ∗ HHI
d
. When all firms only strategy is to set their output price as low as possible and
maximize sales, λ will equal to zero. In general, however, firms employ a variety of
12
strategies at the same time. This paper treats λ as a function of strategic variables
possessed by the firms that can be written as follows:
λ = λ(·), λ ∈ [0, 1] (2.8)
MM = λ(·) ∗ HHI
d
∗ P (2.9)
The industry level marketing margin (accepting that the live animal price and whole-
sale carcass price are good proxies for marginal cost at different stages of the supply
chain) is dependent on the effect of strategy variables, the market concentration, the
elasticity of demand and the retail price. How important is the implication of some
key strategic variables for the meat industry? What is the impact of rising concen-
tration? What is the interaction between market power and key strategic variables?
In this paper, two potential strategic variables are examined that firms may employ.
The models also examine the effect of market concentration. This is accomplished
by building econometric models that exploit the underpinnings of the Lerner Index
under Cournot competition and previous efforts to model the marketing margins in
agriculture.
2.3 Proposed Strategy Variables
2.3.1 Cold Storage
Cold storage is a commodity storage aimed to preserve the physical natural of
perishable goods. (Williams & Wright, 1998) From Jan 1985 to Dec 2014, total pork
production increased by 69% while total cold storage increased by 77%. Even though
monthly pork in cold storage is more than 20% of total pork supply, little previous
research has been done about cold storage as an important factor in the pork industry.
In the long-run, supply and demand will reach static equilibrium. However, in
the short-run, when the biological cycle of live animal production sets a limit to
13
Figure 2.3. Total Pork Supply and Cold Storage Stock
the quantity supplied, the clearing of market is much more complex. It is not that
disequilibrium occurs in the short run, although that might be temporarily the case
in localized markets, but rather that prices and storage are forced to absorb most
of the adjustment required to clear the short run market. Storage is an option to
shift supply from one period to another. Cold storage acts as a short run buffer
between supply and demand. If cold storage stock can be used as strategic variable
by packers, hog packers may be able to buy fewer animals when the live animal
price is high and release their cold storage stock to avoid paying higher prices for
live animals to still meet short run demands of retailers. When the cash market
price at the farm level is low, meat packers can buy more animals from growers
but not flood the retail market with meat by increasing cold storage stocks. They
can keep the processed meat in cold storage and release the stock when farm level
price is high and/or when retail demand is high. If packers can use this strategy
to increase profit, then it should be evident in the marketing margins. Cold storage
14
stock alternatively represent a logistical necessity that allows packers operate large-
scale plants at optimal capacity utilization and thereby reduce unit processing cost.
These cost savings at the wholesale level may be passed on to the retail level in the
form of lower prices and/or to the farmers in the form of higher live animal prices. The
role as strategic tool and logistic tool are not in conflict with each other, they can co-
exist. However, they will have opposite directional effects on the marketing margin, in
general. In order to describe this phenomenon, cold storage stock as an independent
variable is introduced into a standard marketing margin model. The ability to store
product, especially when that storage is either large in scale or implicitly coordinated
across the industry due to the common market signals to the relatively few packers
leads to a modeling innovation introduced in this paper.
2.3.2 Captive Supply
According to (GIPSA, 2002), captive supply is defined as livestock that is owned
or fed by a packer more than 14 days prior to slaughter, livestock that is procured by
a packer through a contract or marketing agreement that has been in place for more
than 14 days, or livestock that is otherwise committed to a packer more than 14 days
prior to slaughter. The percentage of captive supply in total hog supply increased
from 29.4% in Jan 2007 to 34% in Dec 2014.
Captive supply can benefit packers by two ways, maintain the output reliability
and improving the cost efficiency. Captive supply helps packers to maintain a reliable
production level to fulfill the pork demand from the retail market. In order to reach
the maximum production efficiency and lowest processing cost, packing plants need
to maintain very high levels of capacity utilization on a daily basis. When the cash
market price is high, packers who own captive supplies can use their captive supplies
instead of purchasing live animals from the cash market. The option to have captive
supply will decrease the demand for live animals and thus their price.
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Figure 2.4. The Percentage of Captive Supply in Total Hog Supply
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Researchers and farmers have long been concerned about the adverse effect on
cash market price. Ward and Schroeder(Ward & Schroeder, 1998) were the first
to estimate the total captive supply inventory impact on the cash market traction
price and no significant adverse effects were found. Zhang and Sexton (Zhang &
Sexton, 2000) found that in a concentrated spatial market captive supply can be used
by packers to manipulate the spot market price. Although much research has been
conducted about the correlation between captive supply and farm price, researchers
did not pay much attention on its impact on wholesale price and retail price. The cost
efficiency potentially gained by use of captive supply could be passed upward through
the supply chain to result in lower wholesale and/or retail price. And the impacts
of captive supply on Farm-Retail margin and Farm-Wholesale margin are unknown.
When meat packers benefit from captive supply, there are two possible outcomes. If
packers do not share benefits with retailers, the marketing margin is expected to be
larger due to low cash market price. If wholesalers share the benefit with retailers,
the Farm-Wholesale and Farm-Retail margin is expected to be unchanged or smaller.
In this paper, the impact of captive supply on Farm-Wholesale and Farm-Retail
margin is evaluated. While most previous research used annual data for empirical
analysis, this paper uses monthly data in an effort to better identify the short run
implications of strategic behavior. The statistical analysis is based on U.S pork
industry data. Pork is good case study industry to examine in this context because
it is one of the most significant commodities in the U.S. meat complex, has seen
substantial consolidation among processors, has experienced growth in cold storage
utilization, heavily utilizes captive supply, and is relatively easily tracked as a product
through the supply chain from farm to retail.
The short-run supply of pork is limited by the production cycle of hogs. According
to USDA, only 5% of hogs were grown under production contracts in 1992 but this has
increased to over 70% in 2009. While 70% of the hogs in the U.S. may be produced
under production contracts, it is important to point out that meat packers are not
the originators of most of those contracts. Typically, the contracting principal is
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an intermediary that produces baby pigs, contracts the grow-out of those pigs with
farmer agents, and then markets to meat packers through a variety of marketing
contract arrangements that depend on spot market prices or past spot market prices.
The percentage of captive supply in total hog supply has remained relative sta-
ble at around 30% from 2007 to 2014. The top four pork packers had 65.5% of
market share of total slaughter at the end of 2014. USDA produces monthly cold
storage reports that contain end-of-month stocks of commodities like meats. Data
are collected from warehouses that normally store commodities for 30 days or more
(USDA, 2016). The captive supply data is collected from the national weekly manda-
tory price reports of purchased swine from USDA (USDA, 2007).The percentage of
captive supply is calculated by dividing the monthly quantity of packer owned and
packer sold swine by total monthly supply of swine. GIPSA has reported the four
firm concentration for meat-packing industry in the annual report of Packers and
Stockyards programs(GIPSA, 1996-2013). USDA has collected the annual four firm
concentration data of the grocery retailers from 1992 to 2013 (USDA, 2015) GIPSA
only reported the four firm concentration ratio for packers annually and USDA only
published the four firm concentration ratio for retailers on an annual frequency. Be-
cause monthly concentration data is not publicly available, this paper uses the annual
data by holding the concentration ratio constant for twelve months in a year. The
consolidation and industrialization from 1980s to mid-1990s created dramatic changes
to the U.S meat industry culminating in a dramatic structural change in the pork
industry and the lowest recorded live hog prices in U.S. history in 1999. The esti-
mated models were divided to two different time periods to eliminate the effect from
dramatic structural change. This structural change occurred just prior to 2000 as
packer consolidation and high supply of live hogs led to some of the lowest hog prices
in U.S. history. As a result, there was massive restructuring at the farm level in the
industry and a more stable concentration in the packing sector has been the general
case thereafter.
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2.4 The Empirical Models
2.4.1 The Basic Framework
Wohlgenant and Mullen (Wohlgenant & Mullen, 1987) proposed a set of alterna-
tive empirical specifications for the marketing margin using beef as their example. In
perfectly competitive markets, the price of farm output depends on the quantity of
agricultural commodity produced, retail level price, and marketing input prices. The
relationship can be described by an inverse derived demand function for the farm
product as follows:
Pf = f(Q,Pr, C) (2.10)
Where Pf is the price of farm output, Q is the quantity of agricultural commodity
produced, Pr is the retail price of product, C is a variable represents all marketing










Relative farm-retail marketing margin measures the marketing margin in retail units
(assuming a fixed proportions at a given time disassembly process in meat processing).
The farm-retail marketing margin is MM = Pr −Pf . The relative marketing margin
is equal to one minus relative farm price to retail price. Relative farm price is eq.











Farm-retail marketing margin, can be rewritten as the function (2.13)
MM = Pr ∗ h(Q, C
Pr
) = K(Pr, Pr ∗Q,C) (2.13)
Wohlgenant and Mullen (Wohlgenant & Mullen, 1987) tested three competing em-
pirical specifications for the farm- retail marketing margin for beef.
MM = a0 + a1 ∗ Pr + a2 ∗ C + 1 (2.14)
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MM = b1 ∗ Pr + b2 ∗ PrQt + b3 ∗ C + 2 (2.15)
MM = d0 + d1 ∗Qt + d2 ∗ C + 3 (2.16)
MM is the farm-retail marketing margin for hog, dollar per pound, Pr is the retail
price for pork, dollar per pound, Qt is per capita pork production (total production
divided by total population), marketing cost index C is the average of producer pro-
duction index and wage index, 1997=100. All pork price data were deflated by the
U.S city average seasonally adjusted pork CPI. Eq(2.14) is the mark up pricing model;
Eq(2.15) is the relative marketing margin model; Eq(2.16) is the real marketing mar-
gin formulation. Wohlgenant and Mullen (Wohlgenant & Mullen, 1987) concluded
that eq(2.15), the relative marketing margin specification, is preferred. Eq(2.15) is
selected as the basic model and it is expanded to measure how strategic variables and
market concentration will affect the marketing margin.
2.4.2 Marketing Cost Index
Prior to 1980 USDA published a Food Marketing Cost index to measure the
changes in prices of food processing inputs, wholesaling and retailing (Harp, 1980).
The index included the cost of labor, packaging materials, transportation services,
energy, advertising, rent, maintenance and repair, business services, property tax
and insurance, supplies, and interest. The purpose of this index is to explain the
difference between farm prices and retail price. According to the USDA report in
1980, the marketing cost index was constructed by aggregating forty price series.
Seventeen of these prices are from PPI while 10 of them are from CPI. Labor cost
is 46.8% of the total index which is far more than the second important price series,
the packaging cost (Harp, 1980). Another research paper based on industry survey
data also indicated that labor cost is the most important price series in the animal
processing industry. In this case, the researchers interviewed managers of eight pork
processing firms that accounted for 70% of industry market share. Hayenga (Hayenga,
1998) divided the pork marketing cost by fixed cost and variable cost as table 2.1.
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Table 2.1.
Pork Slaughter and Processing Cost 1996-97







Compared to a single shift plant, a double shift plant reduces the fixed cost per
unit of output by 50% or more and may reduce the variable cost by 10% on average.
Labor cost is approximately 47% of variable cost based on the data mentioned above.
Based on table 2.2, labor cost is on average $10.34/head for single shift plant and
$9.40/head for a double shift plant. The labor cost accounts 38% of total processing
cost in a single shift plant. If the processor switches to two shifts, the share of
labor in total cost increases to 43%. While USDA has discontinued publication of
the marketing cost index, labor cost appears to be the single most important item
for the slaughter industry. Therefore, the labor cost per unit of output is used in
this paper to reflect intermediate processing costs. Labor cost per unit of output is
computed by dividing the real wage per hour (BLS, 2016) by the slaughter industry
labor productivity index (BLS, 2016).
2.4.3 The Extended Models and Test Results at Different Market Level
For each model, the marketing margin is tested at three levels: farm-wholesale,
wholesale-retail, and farm-retail. At farm-wholesale level, wholesale price is used as
the independent variable instead of retail price. In this paper, empirical specifications
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are estimated using U.S monthly data from January 2000 to December 2014. There
are several reasons to pick post-2000 period.
The meat processing industry experienced industrialization and consolidation be-
tween 1980s to late 1990s but has been more stable after 2000. The four firm con-
centration ratio increased by 75% from 1985 to 1999 while it has only increased by
16% between 2000 to 2014. Before 2000, meat processors were focused on mergers
and upgrading of their production plants to obtain more market share. When the
market became relatively stable, meat processors focus more on vertical integration
and new product that meet consumer preference. According to Lawrence, Schroeder,
and Hayenga’s survey of 20 largest U.S pork packers in 1995, packers had started or
planned to adapt a vertical coordination arrangement. (Lawrence, Rhodes, Grimes,
& Hayenga, 1998) Another survey in 1999 of the 11 largest pork packers showed that
packers’ needed shift to more quality control and product consistency to respond the
demand from retailers and the ultimate consumers. The survey in 1999 also found
that the branding programs by packers had grown rapidly as packers tried to differ-
entiate their products. (Zering & Martinez, 2004) (Lawrence, Schroeder, & Hayenga,
2001)
The increasing contractual relationship between hog farmers and meat processors
is changing the structure of the hog industry. From 1997 to 1999, it is easy to see the
spike of marketing margin from figure 2.2 that is due to the historic low farm price.
As the live hog price tumbled to historic lows, the market volatility changed the
structure of hog production. More farmers became involved in contract production
with hog processors and intermediaries.
Initial estimation of the models was plagued by autocorrelation. This is supported
by DurbinWatson statistics for those regression that range from 0.57 to 1.45 suggest-
ing severe autocorrelation. There is substantial investment in the physical capital of
live hog production at any given time. This investment takes the form of physical
facilities for production, feed manufacture, and breeding stock. This investment is
teamed with a biological production process that involves a gestation of almost four
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Table 2.2.
Own Price Elasticity of Hog/Pork Supply and Demand at Different Market Level
Own Price Elasticity Farm Processing Retail Source
hog demand -0.51 Wohlgenant, 1989
pork demand -0.71 Brester ,2004
pork demand -0.79 Brester ,2004
hog supply 0.41 Lemieux and Wohlgenant, 1989
pork supply 0.44 Brester ,2004
pork supply 0.73 Brester ,2004
months and up to six months for feeding pigs to slaughter weight. The combination
results in substantial inertia in supply and thus the price of live hogs. Likewise, the
capital investments in meat processing tend to result in a strong incentive to maintain
a high level of daily capacity utilization and thus stable at other points along the sup-
ply chain. Thus, it is likely that the autocorrelation measured in the initial models
is structural in nature and best handled with lagged dependent variables rather than
a serially correlated random component in the regression
In all tables, the margin is the dependent variable on the left side of the equation
and the lagged margin is the lagged dependent variable on the right side of the
equation. From Table 2.2 it can be seen that the elasticity of supply and demand at
the farm level are more inelastic than at other points along the marketing channel.
If there is a strategic variable that processors can use to affect the market, farmers
will likely bear more of the effect on prices.
The first extended model introduces cold storage as a strategic variable in Eq(2.15).
It is defined as cold storage per capita, the quantity of cold storage on the final day
of the previous month divided by US monthly population. If the cold storage stock
is high and the information is publicly available, wholesalers will expect higher sup-
ply in the current period. They can purchase less from farmers lowering the farm
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price, ceteris paribus. The marketing margin is expected to be larger with higher
cold storage stock. The extended model adds a lag dependent variable to correct for
autocorrelation. Earlier it was pointed out that cold storage may be used as a means
of manipulating prices and as a means of capturing logistical efficiencies. Even though
the focus in this paper is the primarily on the 2000 to 2014 period, it is interesting
to compare how cold storage stock affected the marketing margin under the different
market conditions represented by the pre- and post-2000 periods.
The second extended model introduces captive supply as a strategic variable in
the basic model. The Mandatory Price Report started from 2007 and thus there is
not enough data available to compare the pre- and post-2000 period. The observation
period for estimating the extended models with captive supply is from 2007 to 2014.
The last extended model is the basic model with the packer concentration ratio
and retailer concentration ratio. In the earlier discussion of the Lerner index, it was
shown that the marketing margin depends on the aggregate strategic behavior, the
Herfindal Index or market concentration, the own price elasticity of demand and the
retail price. The last model examines how concentration affects the marketing margin
at different points along the supply chain. The best market concentration indicator
available is the four firm concentration ratio. USDA only reported the retail CR4
ratio from 1993 to 2013. Again, there is insufficient data to examine the pre-2000
time period so the paper estimates these models only for the 2000 to 2013 time
period.Estimates of this model for the 1993 to 2013 period were qualitatively similar
to those presented.
2.4.4 Extended Model at Farm-Wholesale Level
Regression results for the farm-wholesale level are reported in table 2.3. At Farm-
Wholesale level, the effect of wholesale price on Farm-Wholesale margin depends on
two things, the coefficient of wholesale price and the interaction term with quantity.
The bounds of the observed quantity data are from 4.89 to 7.07 pounds per capita.
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The quantity threshold is 4 pounds for basic model, 7.6 pounds for the extended
model with cold storage before 2000, 4.7 pounds for the extended model with cold
storage after 2000, 1.7 pounds for the extended model with captive supply and 5.3
pounds for the extended model with concentration ratios. For the basic model, the
extended model with cold storage after 2000, and the extended model with captive
supply, the quantity level necessary to result in a negative marginal effect is unlikely in
the observation period and the effect of wholesale price on Farm-Wholesale margin is
positive as expected. However, in the pre-2000 period the effect of wholesale price on
Farm-Wholesale margin is negative for the extended model with cold storage and the
negative marginal effect is also possible for the extended model with concentration
ratio. The estimated coefficient of marketing cost index is positive in the Farm-
Wholesale level model but only statistically significant in the basic model and the
extended model with cold storage before 2000. The estimated coefficient of cold
storage is statistically significant and negative in pre- and post- 2000 period. The
mean elasticity of cold storage per capita at Farm-Wholesale level is -0.17 in 1985-1999
and -1.13 in 2000-2014. The two estimated coefficient are not statistically different
between the time periods. The elasticity estimates, however, suggests that from
1985 to 2014 the efficiency gains of logistical use of cold storage much more strongly
dominate any remaining anti-competitive effects on the Farm-Wholesale margin.
The estimated coefficient of captive supply is negative for the Farm-Wholesale
level model. Packers should experience a higher margin between farm and wholesale
level if captive supply was being used strategically to decrease the farm price. But the
result suggests that during this period increasing captive supply actually decreased
the marketing margin. If marketing margin is viewed as the aggregation of marketing
cost, the logistical efficiency gains from increasing captive supply dominated any other
possible adverse effects. The estimated coefficient of CR4 packer and CR4 retailer
are both negative and not statistically significant at Farm-Wholesale level. The cost
reduction from consolidation and industrialization appears to generate efficiency in
meat processing industry which dominates any market power exerted and results in
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Table 2.3.
Regression Results of Basic Model and Extended Models at Farm-Wholesale Level
Basic Model CS (1987-1999) CS (2000-2014) Captive Supply CR4 Packer and Retailer
Margin FWMM FWMM FWMM FWMM FWMM
Pw -0.080*** -0.183*** -0.084*** -0.04 -0.128***
(-2.84) (-5.85) (-3.02) (-0.93) (-3.65)
PwQs 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(3.92) (3.39) (3.54) (3) (4.58)
MCI($/index) 0.612 ** 1.210* 0.389 0.837 0.576
(2.34) (1.8) (1.4 ) (1.2) (1.62)








lag.Margin 0.597 0.695 0.6 0.55 0.54
Adjusted Rˆ2 0.501 0.756 0.513 0.477 0.505
*the coefficient statistically significant at 10% level
**the coefficient statistically significant at 5% level
***the coefficient statistically significant at 1% level
a lower Farm-Wholesale margin. The regression results are consistent with earlier
research done by Chung and Tostao that efficiency effects are larger than the market
power effects for the meat packing industry.
2.4.5 Extended Model at Wholesale-Retail Level
Regression results for the farm-wholesale level are reported in table 2.4. For all
models at Wholesale-Retail level, the estimated coefficient of retail price is positive.
In the extended model with cold storage before 2000, the estimated coefficient of
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cold storage is positive and statistically significant. In the later time period, the
estimated coefficient of cold storage is negative but not statistically significant. The
two estimated coefficients of cold storage are statistically different between the time
periods. These results suggest that during the period when the pork industry was
rapidly consolidating cold storage was being used strategically to affect prices and
this effect dominated any logistical efficiency gains. However, the result suggests that
in the more stable recent years, if anything, the efficiency gains of logistical use of cold
storage dominate any remaining strategic effects on prices. The changing sign of cold
storage is an evidence of changing marketing strategic for meat processors. Instead of
simply obtaining more market share through consolidation, their strategic focus may
have shifted to supply reliability and satisfying consumer demand by differentiating
product mix.
The estimated coefficient of captive supply is negative and statistically significant
for the Wholesale-Retail level model. The negative coefficient suggests that during
this period increasing captive supply will not only decrease the Farm-Wholesale mar-
gin but also the margin at Wholesale-Retail level. The exclusive contract relationship
between farmers and processors, or captive supply, is one form of vertical integration
to help large scale processors to work as reliable suppliers of boxed meat and negotiate
for higher wholesale price in the market. In the last extended model, the estimated
coefficient of CR4 packer is negative but statistically significant at Wholesale-Retail
level. When larger packers have market power at Wholesale-Retail market, the mar-
gin gets smaller as expected because packers would like to charge more on wholesale
price that decrease the price difference between wholesale and retail level.
Based on table 2.4, the estimated coefficient of retailer concentration ratio is pos-
itive and statistically significant at Wholesale-Retail level. When the retailer concen-
tration increases, their oligoposony power allow them negotiate for lower wholesale
price such that the Wholesale-Retail margin increases. The absolute value of esti-
mated coefficient for CR4 packer is smaller than the estimated coefficient of CR4
retailer. The mean elasticity at Wholesale-Retail level for CR4 packer is -0.154 while
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Table 2.4.
Regression Results of Basic Model and Extended Models at Wholesale-Retail Level
Basic Model CS (1987-1999) CS (2000-2014) Captive Supply CR4 Packer and Retailer
Margin WRMM WRMM WRMM WRMM WRMM
Pr 0.132*** 0.154*** 0.129*** 0.249*** 0.194***
(2.77) (3.27) (2.71) (2.72) (3.47)
PrQs 0.009** 0.022*** 0.008** 0.011* 0.008**
(2.37) (4.24) (1.96) (1.81) (2.24)
MCI($/index) 0.969*** -3.617*** 0.718 0.969 1.03*
(1.95) (-3.80) (1.28) (0.66) (1.66)








lag.Margin 0.726 0.767 0.758 0.659 0.733
Adjusted Rˆ2 0.683 0.862 0.683 0.616 0.75
*the coefficient statistically significant at 10% level
**the coefficient statistically significant at 5% level
***the coefficient statistically significant at 1% level
it is 0.112 for CR4 retailer. It is because the average concentration ratio at process-
ing level is much higher than the average concentration ratio at retail level in this
period. If the retail concentration ratio keeps increasing in the future, the elasticity
may change and have a larger effect on the marketing margin.
2.4.6 Extended Model at Farm-Retail Level
The marketing margin at Farm-Retail level is the sum of marketing margin at
Farm-Wholesale Level and Wholesale-Retail level. As the Wholesale-Retail margin
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takes the larger share of Farm-Retail margin, most of their estimate results have the
same sign and similar patterns while the Farm-Wholesale margin is different from
the other two. Regression results for the Farm-Retail level are reported in table
2.5. Combining the cold storage effect at Farm-Wholesale level and Wholesale-Retail
level, the estimated coefficient of cold storage is positive and statistically significant
at the Farm-Retail level before 2000. In the post-2000 model, the estimated coeffi-
cient of cold storage is negative but not statistically significant. The two estimated
coefficient of cold storage are statistically different between the time periods. Just
like the Wholesale-Retail level, the changing sign of cold storage at Farm-Retail level
is an evidence of changing marketing strategy for meat processors. The wholesalers
focus may have shifted to supply reliability and satisfying consumer demand by dif-
ferentiating product mix. The estimated coefficient of captive supply is negative and
statistically significant at the Farm-Retail level. Instead of keeping the efficiency gain
at the wholesale level, packers pass their cost saving to retailers that captive supply
has significant effect at Farm-Retail that overall marketing margin is reduced.
Based on table 2.5, the estimated coefficient of retailer concentration ratio is
positive and statistically significant at Farm-Retail level. When the retailers have
more market power, they can put more price pressure to wholesalers. According
to table 2.2, eventually farmers will bear most of the price pressure because their
own price supply elasticity is relatively inelastic and the overall marketing margin
will increase. The negative estimated coefficient of CR4 packers indicates that cost
reduction from consolidation and industrialization appears to dominates any market
power exerted because the estimates suggest that the overall Farm-Retail margin is
decreasing with higher packer concentration. Even though the estimated coefficient
of CR4 packer is smaller than the estimated coefficient of retailers, the mean absolute
elasticity at the Farm-Retail level for CR4 packer (0.208) is larger than that of CR4
retailer (0.161). Currently, the concentration at the processing level is much higher
than the concentration at the retail level. If the retail concentration ratio keeps
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Table 2.5.
Regression Results of Basic Model and Extended Models at Farm-Retail Level
Basic Model CS (1987-1999) CS (2000-2014) Captive Supply CR4 Packer and Retailer
Margin MM MM MM MM MM
Pr 0.205*** 0.158*** 0.203*** 0.433*** 0.284***
(3.64) (2.58) (3.6) (4.41) (4.12)
PrQs 0.019*** 0.042*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.018***
(3.98) (5.83) (3.43) (3.38) (3.86)
MCI($/index) 2.031*** -4.202*** 1.643** 3.430** 2.34*
(3.39) (-3.45) (2.51) (2.19) (3.02)








lag.Margin 0.654 0.751 0.691 0.513 0.65
Adjusted Rˆ2 0.703 0.875 0.705 0.665 0.742
*the coefficient statistically significant at 10% level
**the coefficient statistically significant at 5% level
***the coefficient statistically significant at 1% level
increasing in the future, the elasticity may change and have a larger effect on Farm-
Retail margin.
2.5 Summary and Conclusion
Farmers and researchers have been concerned about the increasing marketing con-
centration and possible strategic behavior in livestock and meat markets for decades.
This paper expands on previous research by examining some new variables that could
either be exploited through imperfect competition or be the source of operational effi-
30
ciencies. When the market experienced rapid consolidation and industrialization, the
strategic use of cold storage to manipulate prices appears to have been its dominant
role. During the more stable period since 2000, the dominant role of cold storage
appears to have shifted to one of logistical efficiency. The effect of cold storage stock
on marketing margins become less significant and negative.
Concern is often expressed about the potential for captive supply to depress live
animal price. This paper examines this possibility via its effect on the marketing mar-
gin based on most recent eight-year data from 2007 to 2014. However, no statistically
significant effects between captive supply and marketing margin at Farm-Wholesale
and Farm-Retail level were found. Based on the result in this paper, captive supply is
more likely generating logistical efficiencies by allowing better coordination between
dynamic short run supply and demand.
Overall, the strategic variables examined (cold storage and captive supply) show
some negative effects on marketing margin after 2000. However, evidence is found
that support their use in allowing processors maintain optimal levels of capacity
utilization. The lower costs are at least partially passed back to farmers in the form
of higher live animal prices and on to consumers in the form of lower retail prices.
In addition, farmers who contract to grow out captive supply animal are bearing less
market risk (Johnson & Foster, 1994).
Most previous research has focused on packers market power as the packing in-
dustry is more concentrated compared to farmers and retailers. Chung and Tostao
considered both market power from processors and retailers at Farm-Wholesale level.
They found packers are unlikely to exercise market power on retail prices but may
exercise some market power on the farm price. In this paper, we test the wholesaler
concentration and retailer concentration as two independent variables in an extended
model. The wholesale concentration shows a negative effect on the marketing margin.
The retail concentration has a positive effect on the marketing margin. In the tra-
ditional view, a high concentration ratio implies oligopoly/oligoposony power which
would be harmful for another party in the market. In the meat industry, consolida-
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tion and industrialization are not only increasing the size and scale of packing firms
but also increasing the production efficiency and lower overall cost of production.
Large packers reduce their processing and packing cost by using new technologies
like double shift plants and decreasing the labor cost per unit of output. Within a
relative stable market, tools like cold storage and captive supply have the potential to
generate important cost efficiencies but in less stable circumstances firms may be able
to use them to strategically affect prices. If the meat industry experiences another
wave of consolidation or industrialization, other market participants should be wary
of how activities like cold storage and captive supply will affect prices.
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CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIC VARIABLES BY MEAT PACKERS: TOOLS OF
HIGHER MARGIN OR LOWER COST
3.1 Introduction
In the past thirty years, meat packers have received plenty of blame accusing them
of using their large presence in the market to decrease the prices they pay to farmers
for live animals. Because only meat packers purchase live animals from farmers,
either through some kind of contract or the cash market, it is easy to understand
why farmers, policy makers, and media reporters may associate a lower farm share of
retail price with meat packers procurement strategies. As Figure 3.1 shows that the
farm price as the percentage of retail price fell consistently from 1985 through 1999
before becoming more stable.
Figure 3.1. Farm Price as the Percentage of Retail Price
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The main reason why meat packers are an easy target for criticism is because the
meat packing sector is much more concentrated in economic terms than the livestock
farming sector. The American public also has a romanticized image of farming as
opposed to the impersonal factory image of animal slaughter and meat processing
done by meat packers.
These differing perceptions may also contribute to the tendency to level blame for
low farm prices at the packing industry. The large size of meat packing companies
means that they may have the market power to negotiate lower prices paid to farmers
and also higher wholesale prices received from retailers. Facing this higher cost,
retailers would raise the price consumers pay for meat products at grocery store. The
difference between price at any two market levels is known as the marketing margin.
For example, the farm to wholesale marketing margin is the wholesale price of meat
minus the farm price of the live animals adjusted for the yield of meat per pound
of live animal. For packers, farm price is what meat packers pay for live animals as
an input and the wholesale price is what they receive from selling the meat products
to retailers and further processors. By dividing the Farm-to-Retail margin into two
parts, Farm-to-Wholesale Margin and Wholesale-to-Retail Margin, it is easy to see
that Farm-to-Retail and Wholesale-to-Retail margins have increased from 1985 to
2014 while Farm-to-Wholesale margin is relative stable around $0.2/lb in real terms.
In the past thirty years, there are several reasons explaining the enlarge margin
between Farm-to-Retail and Wholesale-to-Retail level. First, the increasing demand
for boxed meat increased the packing cost at processing level. With more dual-earner
families, consumers are preferring ready to cook products that also increased the
packaging and further processing cost. A portion of these added costs is born by
consumers in the form of higher retail prices and a portion is born by processors and
farmers in the form of lower prices for their products. These all effect the marketing
margins at the different points along the supply chain. Second, both the wholesale
and retail sector are highly concentrated and may be in a position to affect prices
in their favor through various production and marketing strategies. Third, efficiency
34
Figure 3.2. U.S Pork Farm-to-Retail, Farm-to-Wholesale, Wholesale-
to-Retail Margin, Jan 1985-Dec 2014
gains at different levels along the marketing channel result in cost savings. These cost
savings get distributed along the marketing channel. For example, increased scale in
the meat packing sector has led to lower costs that may result in higher prices for
live animals paid to farmers and lower wholesale prices paid by retailers and further
processors. The efficiency gains are not limited to the meat packers. The average hog
farm size has increased from 804 head in 1992 to 4730 head in 2004 base on live hog
sales (Key & McBrid, 2008). At the same time, the per pound feed to hog weight
gain has increased almost 80% and the labor use has decreased to only one sixth what
it was previously. (Key & McBrid, 2008).
A larger marketing margin implies a higher gross margin if everything that could
affect the marketing margin is held equal. Therefore, society has an interest in know-
ing whether and how packers are exercising their pricing power. Do they use any
specific strategies to enlarge the price difference? Do packers have more pricing power
with increasing concentration and contracting in their industry? In this article, two
possible strategic variables are examined: cold storage and captive supply.
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A larger marketing margin implies a higher gross margin if everything that could
affect the marketing margin is held equal. Therefore, society has an interest in know-
ing whether and how packers are exercising their pricing power. Do they use any
specific strategy variables to enlarge the price difference? Do packers have more pric-
ing power with increasing concentration and contracting in their industry? In this
article, two possible strategic variables are discussed, and the author try to answer
the questions based on the research results.
3.2 The Meat Packing Industry (structure change and cause)
The four-firm concentration ratio, or CR4, is a widely used measure of industry
concentration. It is the sum of market share of the four largest firms. According
to the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), the four
firm concentration ratio for pork packers in the United States increased from 32.2%
in 1985 to 65.5% by the end of 2014 while the four firm concentration ratio for beef
packers increased from 39% in 1985 to 85% by the end of 2012. According to the
Department of Justice, pork packers are moderately concentrated and beef packers
are highly concentrated (of Justice, 2015). It is important for us to understand the
driving force of sharp consolidation and industrialization in the past thirty years.
Like any public or private business, one of the goals of meat packers is profit which
is highly reflected in the marketing margin because live animals represent the largest
portion of meat packer cost of production. Table 1 shows that the average processing
cost per head was $5 lower if pork packers moved from single shift to double shift in
1996-1997. That means if everything else remained the same, packer margins would
increase by $5 per head. According to the CME, the gross pork packer margin in
the same year was only $10-$15 per head. If packers chose to switch from single shift
to double shift, their per head margin would likely have increased by 33% to 50%.
Meanwhile, they would have earned this increased margin over a much larger volume.
MacDonald and Ollinger (Macdonald & Ollinger, 2005) found that with larger-scale
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Table 3.1.
Pork Slaughter and Processing Cost 1996-97








plants the average industry processing cost for beef packers decreased by 35.3%. They
also found large plants have higher fixed costs such as capital and labor cost and to
be competitive these plants must process a large volume of animals each day. If the
production volume falls short, then the short-term processing cost can rise sharply.
For meat packers that own larger processing plants, a larger and consistent flow of
live animal is required in order to maintain competitiveness. All these phenomena
have promoted the consolidation and industrialization in the meat packing industry.
3.3 Strategic Variables
Meat packing industry is a typical oligopoly/oligoposony industry that a small
number of firms have the large majority of market share. There are many possible
strategic variables they can use to apply their pricing power. Cold storage is one of
them. Cold storage is defined as a commodity storage aimed to preserve the physical
natural of perishable goods. (Williams & Wright, 1998) For example, total pork
production increased by 69% while total pork cold storage stock increased by 77%
from 1985 to 2014. As cold storage stock is more than 20% of total pork supply, it
becomes an important variable to affect to supply and demand at the wholesale level.
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One possibility is that large meat packers can use cold storage as a buffer to buy
more animals from farmers when the cash price is low and sell the meat out of cold
storage when farm price is high or retail demand is high. Another possibility is that
meat packers use cold storage as logistical tool to operate their plants at the optimal
level and thus reduce the unit cost of production. When the retail demand is high,
releasing the cold storage stock can also help to increase the pork supply and lower
the retail price.
Another possible strategic variable is captive supply. Captive supply is an ex-
clusive contract between farmers and packers that the livestock is owned or fed by a
packer for more than 14 days before slaughter. For example, the percentage of captive
supply in total hog supply is 32% in 2014. Previous research focused on whether this
exclusive contract will negatively affect the farm price. When more hog production
is contract-based, the demand for live animals from the cash market will decrease
and eventually depress the farm price of live animals. On the anther hand, farmers
who are involved in the captive supply production face less market risk. The captive
supply may help packers to purchase live animals at higher efficiency and lower cost
or to buffer live animal supply shortages and keep their processing plants operating
at optimal capacity utilization.
3.4 Our Research
The increasing concentration in the U.S meat packing industry has not only piqued
the public interest but also that of agricultural economist. The pork industry data
is used as sample case in this study. Based on the research, some interesting results
are found. The estimate effect of cold storage on marketing margin is not always the
same.
When the pork industry was rapidly consolidating from early 1980s to late 1990s,
the cold storage effect on the Farm-to-Retail and Wholesale-to-Retail margin was
positive. This suggests that the market power strategic use of cold storage during
38
that time outweighed the efficiency gains that cold storage use might have created.
When the market was more stable (post 2000), the cold storage effect on the marketing
margin was negative and less statistically significant. The efficiency gains from having
large cold storage capacity appear to dominate any strategic effects during that time.
That is, cold storage in recent years appears to have allowed meat packers to maintain
consistent and optimal production levels that reduce their processing cost per unit.
Some of these efficiency gains appear to be passed on to farmers in the form of higher
live animal prices and to retailers and consumers in the form of lower wholesale and
retail prices.
The changing effect of cold storage on marketing margins is evidence of the chang-
ing role of strategic variables under different market conditions and that while con-
centration may lead to anti-competitive behavior the scale efficiencies gained can lead
to a situation where other market participants also gain.Most previous research fo-
cused on the effect of captive supply on live animal price. This research focuses on
the impact of captive supply on the marketing margin.
If captive supply has been used strategically to decrease the farm price, to the a
wider marketing margin should be observed with increasing captive supply. Analysis
of the data tells us a different story that with increasing captive supply the margin
is getting smaller. It would appear that the use of captive supplies, during the
observed time period from 2007 to 2014, improved plant efficiency and that this
effect dominated any anti-competitive effect on prices. Finally, the concentration
effect on the marketing margin is tested. The cost reduction from consolidation and
industrialization appears to generate efficiency in the pork packing industry which
dominates any market power exerted and results in a lower margin.
Despite the high level of concentration, there is not substantial evidence that
packers are exercising pricing power in such a way that it exceeds efficiency gains
from economies of scale. Strategic variables such as cold storage and captive supply
are more likely to generate a net reduction in the marketing margin as efficiencies
are partially shared with other participants in the supply chain - including consumers
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and dominate the effects of anti-competitive behavior. In the observation period, the
major effect of increasing concentration is helping packers achieve higher efficiency
and lower cost. Policy makers should likely keep an eye on the stability of the meat
packing sector. If any major event in the future changes the relative market stability,
they should closely examine how packers use strategic variables such as cold storage
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Appendix A: Alternative Models
A.1 Extended Model with Interaction Term
In order to understand the relationship between strategic variables and market
concentration, this paper tested the standard model eq.2.15 with cold storage, packer
concentration and the interaction terms. Most cold storage is owned by packers so the
interaction term is cold storage stock with packer concentration ratio. Captive supply
is excluded from interaction term because the data is limited and it did not show
any significant effect on the marketing margin. The regression result is summarized
in table A.1. Multicollinearity is a problem in the regression and as a result the
marketing cost index, cold storage per capita, CR4 packer and the interaction term
are all statistically insignificant.
A.2 Extended Model with Relative Market Power Ratio
The relative market power ratio is packer concentration ratio divided by retail
concentration ratio. This ratio can tell the shift of relative market power between
wholesalers and retailers and allows both variables to enter the regression simulta-
neously. They are highly collinear and this approach imposes an implicit restriction
that the coefficient on the wholesale concentration variable is equal to the coefficient
on the inverse of the retail concentration variable. The relative market power ratio is
expected to increase if wholesaler concentration ratio increase at a faster speed than
retailer concentration ratio. The regression results are summarized in table A.2. The
estimated coefficient of the relative market power ratio is consistently negative and
statistically significant at Farm-Retail level and Wholesale-Retail level. When the
wholesaler concentration ratio increases faster than retailer concentration ratio, the
relative market power ratio will increase and the Farm-Retail margin and Wholesale-
Retail margin will decrease. If retail industry is concentrating at a faster speed, than
the relative market power will decrease and the Farm-Retail margin and Wholesale-
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Table A.1.
Regression Result of Extended Model with Interaction Term
Standard Mode+
interaction term











CS per capita 0.176 0.212 -0.103
0.66 (0.94) (-0.89)
CS * CR4 Packer -0.316 -0.359 0.139
(-0.75) (-1.01) (0.76)
CR4 Packer 0.374 0.460 -0.279
(0.53) (0.78) (-0.93)
lag.Margin 0.681 0.75 0.595
Adjusted Rˆ2 0.706 0.684 0.512
*the coefficient statistically significant at 10% level
**the coefficient statistically significant at 5% level
***the coefficient statistically significant at 1% level
Retail will increase. It seems like the fast-rising retailer concentration after 2000 is
more response to the enlarger marketing margin. The regression for Farm-Wholesale
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level is problematic because the autocorrelation problem cant be solved by adding
lag dependent variable or other approaches typically undertaken in such cases.
Table A.2.
Regression Result of Extended Model with Relative Market Power Ratio
Standard Mode+ relative
market power ratio











W/R ratio -0.099** -0.065* 0.002
(-2.21) (-1.81) (0.1)




*the coefficient statistically significant at 10% level
**the coefficient statistically significant at 5% level
***the coefficient statistically significant at 1% level
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A.3 Extended Model with Both Strategic Variables and Market Concentration Ratio
Two strategic variables and two market concentration ratios have been added to
the core model. The regression result is summarized in table A.3. Compare with
extend model only has the concentration ratio, the two concentration ratio are not
statistically significant in this model. At Farm-Wholesale level, the marketing cost
index, captive supply and CR4 packer are not statistically significant. The models
are problematic because the autocorrelation problem cant be solved by adding lag
dependent variable. It may due to high multicollinearity between variables.
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Table A.3.
Regression Result of Extended Model with Both Strategic Variables
and Market Concentration Ratios
Standard Model+ strategic












CS per capita -0.010 -0.026**
(-0.47) (-2.33)
Captive Supply -1.811*** 0.401
(-3.2) (1.44)
CR4 Packer -0.071 0.199
(-0.2) (1.07)
CR4 retailer 0.593 0.532
(0.58) (1.02)
Lag. Margin 0.551 0.425
Adjusted Rˆ2 0.73 0.509
*the coefficient statistically significant at 10% level
**the coefficient statistically significant at 5% level
***the coefficient statistically significant at 1% level
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Appendix B: Elasticity of Margin at Different Market Level
B.1 Cold Storage Elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin
The cold storage effect on marketing margin before and after 2000 in the main
paper is estimated. The figure B.1 has shown that cold storage elasticity of F-R
margin was positive before 2000 and become negative after 2000. The sharp drop is
due to the change of coefficient sign. When the market is relative stable after 2000,
the cold storage elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin is less fluctuated too.
B.2 Cold Storage Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin
The estimated coefficient sign of cold storage at F-W level is always negative and
statistically significant. The elasticity becomes relatively stable after 2000. Based on
the figure B.2, cold storage tends to have higher and more consistent impact on the
marketing margin at Farm-Wholesale level than the other two marketing margins.
Figure B.1. Cold Storage Elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin
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B.3 Cold Storage Elasticity of Wholesale-Retail Margin
The shift of elasticity at Wholesale-Retail level is very similar to the elasticity at
Farm-Retail level. Both coefficient signs change after 2000 causing the decline in the
graph in figure B.3. The elasticity becomes relative stable after 2000.
Figure B.2. Cold Storage Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin
Figure B.3. Cold Storage Elasticity of Wholesale-Retail Margin
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B.4 Captive Supply Elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin
Base on figure 4.1 and figure B.4, the captive supply elasticity of Farm-Retail
margin is larger than the cold storage elasticity of Farm-Retail margin. That means
1% change in captive supply will have a greater impact on the Farm-Retail margin
than a 1% change in cold storage.
B.5 Captive Supply Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin
By comparing figure B.4 and figure B.5, it is easy to see the absolute value of the
captive supply elasticity of Farm-Wholesale margin is smaller than the captive supply
elasticity of Farm-Retail margin. That means 1% change in captive supply will have
a bigger impact on the Farm-Retail margin than on the Farm-Wholesale margin.
B.6 Captive Supply Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin
According to figure B.6, the CR4 packer elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin is in
the range from -0.14 to -0.22. The mean elasticity is -0.19 that means if CR4 Packer
increases by 1% the Farm-Retail margin will on average decrease by 0.19%.
Figure B.4. Captive Supply Elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin
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Figure B.5. Captive Supply Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin
Figure B.6. CR4 Packer Elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin
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Figure B.7. CR4 Packer Elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin
B.7 CR4 Retailer Elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin
According to figure B.7, the CR4 packer elasticity of Farm-Retail Margin is in the
range from 0.11 to 0.18. The mean elasticity is 0.15. When the CR4 retail elasticity
increases by 1%, then the Farm-Retail margin may increase from 0.11% to 0.18%.
The margin will get wider with a higher CR4 retail.
B.8 CR4 Packer Elasticity of Wholesale-Retail Margin
The moving pattern of CR4 packer elasticity of Wholesale-Retail margin in figure
B.8 is very similar to the CR4 packer elasticity of Farm-Retail margin in figure B.6.
The CR4 packer elasticity of Wholesale-Retail Margin is in the range from -0.13 to
-0.21. The mean elasticity is -0.17.
B.9 CR4 Retailer Elasticity of Wholesale-Retail Margin
According to figure B.9, the CR4 retailer elasticity of Wholesale-Retail Margin is
in the range from 0.09 to 0.15. The mean elasticity is 0.12.
52
Figure B.8. CR4 Packer Elasticity of Wholesale-Retail Margin
Figure B.9. CR4 Retailer Elasticity of Wholesale-Retail Margin
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Figure B.10. CR4 Packer Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin
B.10 CR4 Packer Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin
The CR4 packer elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin is in the range from -0.07
to -0.14. The mean elasticity is -0.10. The estimate coefficient of CR4 packer is not
statistically significant.
B.11 CR4 Retailer Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin
The CR4 packer elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Margin is in the range from -0.04 to
-0.08. The mean elasticity is -0.06. Based on figure B.10 and B.11, CR4 retailer has
less impact on Farm-Wholesale margin than CR4 packer. The estimated coefficient
of CR4 retailer is also not statistically significant.
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Figure B.11. CR4 Packer Elasticity of Farm-Wholesale Marginsec
